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This paper addresses the problem of partial tax coordination among regional or national 
sovereign governments in a repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is 
more likely to prevail if the number of regions in a coalition subgroup is smaller and the 
number of existing regions in the entire economy is larger. We also show that under linear 
utility, partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the preference for a local public 
good is stronger. The main driving force for these results is the response of the intensity of tax 
competition. The increased (decreased) intensity of tax competition makes partial tax 
coordination more (less) sustainable. 
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respectively. 1 Introduction
This paper addresses the question of how and under what conditions partial tax coordina-
tion is sustained in a repeated interactions model. The coordination of tax policies among
sovereign jurisdictions has often been considered as a remedy against ineﬃciently low taxes
on mobile tax bases induced by tax competition. Although tax coordination among all the
regions in the whole economy is desirable, generally, it is diﬃcult to achieve full tax coordi-
nation because some regions may prefer a lower tax status for commercial reasons (i.e., the
so-called tax heaven) or because the diﬀerences in social, cultural, and historical factors or
economic fundamentals such as endowments and technologies may prevent the regions from
accepting a common tax rate. Therefore, partial tax coordination, rather than global or full
tax harmonization, is politically more acceptable. As a result, one could be compelled to resort
to partial tax coordination. Indeed, the scenario with partial tax coordination is of particular
importance since it is more likely to occur within a subgroup of countries like the European
Union (EU) member states with close economic and political links.
The academic concern has been fuelled by the increasing public debate on partial tax coor-
dination such as EU corporate tax coordination, which has let to produce several literature on
partial tax coordination. Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) demonstrate that in the standard tax
competition framework with identical countries, partial tax coordination among some regions
can improve not only the welfare of the cooperating regions but also of the noncooperating
ones. Rasmussen (2001) points out that by using a numerical analysis, the critical mass of
countries needed for partial coordination to matter signiﬁcantly is likely to be a very large per-
centage of the economies of the world, with the main beneﬁt accrued to the nonparticipating
countries. More recently, Sugahara et al. (2007) extend Konrad and Schjelderup’s model by
introducing regional asymmetries and show that Konrad and Schjelderup’s conclusion remains
valid even in a multilateral asymmetric tax competition model. Bucovetsky (2008), on the
other hand, shows that in an asymmetric model in terms of the size distribution of population
partial tax harmonization beneﬁts residents of all jurisdictions. Conconi et al. (2008) also
conﬁrm the same conclusion as long as capital is suﬃciently mobile, when capital taxation
1suﬀers from a commitment problem in that once capital has been installed, governments have
ex-post incentives to raise taxes.
These papers provide valuable insights into partial tax cooperation (or harmonization);
h o w e v e r ,t h e ye m p l o yas t a t i co ro n e - s h o tf r a m e w o r kd e s p i t et h eo b v i o u sf a c tt h a tt h ei n t e r -
action between regional or state governments is not with once. Apart from the reality of a
repeated interactions setting, it is well known that repeated interactions facilitate coopera-
tion, and hence, the use of a repeated interactions model would provide a better explanation
of sustained ﬁscal cooperation among regional governments. More importantly, because of the
limitation of a static analysis, the analytical focus of the abovementioned papers lies mainly
on whether or not there is a welfare-enhancing tax coordination as compared to a fully nonco-
operative Nash equilibrium, which does not allow for any coalition among regions. However,
it does not suﬃce to guarantee the sustainability of such a coalition of a subgroup. This is
because in the context of static (one-shot) tax competition, the structure of payoﬀsa c c r u e dt o
regions displays characteristics of “Prisoner’s dilemma”, which is mainly caused by a positive
ﬁscal externality associated with regional tax policies (see Wildasin, 1989). In this case, the
coordinating regions are unable to reach a Pareto superior (or eﬃcient) outcome even if it
exists and to sustain it as a self-enforced equilibrium, because there is a strong incentive for
them to deviate from a Pareto improving coordinated tax rate in order to reap gains.
Furthermore, most of the abovementioned papers take all or subset of countries that may
form a tax-harmonized area as given and focus on whether or not tax harmonization is bene-
ﬁcial to this given group. In other words, the question of how such a partial tax coordination
among sovereign jurisdictions arises of is sustained is abstracted. Hence, it is natural to ex-
plore under what conditions a coalition of a subgroup of regions is sustainable as a next step
for the analysis. Burbidge et al. (1997), within the context of static tax competition games,
have explored whether a subgroup of regions satisﬁes “the stability of coalition” suggested by
d’Aspremont et al. (1983). According to this concept, the current participating and nonpar-
ticipating regions should not have any incentive to change their positions; in other words, a
coalition is internally (externally) stable if there is no incentive for a member (nonmember) re-
gion to withdraw from (join) the coalition. However, partial cooperation in their models need
2to implicitly or explicitly assume the existence of an enforcement mechanism for such collusive
behavior. Indeed, Martin (2002, pp.297) criticizes this concept of cartel stability by stating
in the context of cartels among ﬁrms restricting output that “Static models omit an essential
element of the cost of defecting from an output-restricting equilibrium-the proﬁtt h a ti sl o s t
once rivals realize that the agreement is being violated....Whether or not output restriction
is stable in a dynamic sense depends on whether or not gains from output expansion. But
this trade-oﬀ cannot, by its inherently intertemporal nature, be analyzed in a static model.”
In contrast, the repeated game setting, by comparing such losses and gains, would induce
the participating regions to implement tax coordination as an equilibrium outcome or their
self-enforced behavior but also explicitly provide an enforcement mechanism by fully utilizing
punishment schemes to deter deviation, as long as the participating regions are suﬃciently
patient.
There are several papers that investigate tax coordination in a repeated game setting.
Cardarelli et al. (2002) and Catenaro and Vidal (2006) utilize a repeated interactions model
to demonstrate that coordinated ﬁscal policies or tax harmonization is sustainable. More
recently, Itaya et al. (2008) show that as the regional asymmetries in capital net exporting
positions, which is caused by regional diﬀerences in endowments and/or production technolo-
gies, increase, regions are more likely to cooperate on capital taxes. Nevertheless, all these
papers deal only with global tax coordination among all regions.
This paper discusses partial tax coordination among regions in repeated interactions models
with two types of governments: one that behaves as tax-revenue maximizers and the other that
behaves as utility maximizers. In either setting, we not only show that partial tax coordination
is possible if competing governments are suﬃciently patient but also that it is more likely
to prevail if the number of cooperating regions is smaller and the total number of existing
regions in the economy is larger. Further, these ﬁndings not only reveal that tax competition
potentially enhances the incentive of the regions to sustain partial tax coordination but also
that both regions within and outside the coalition end up being better oﬀ.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model
structure and characterizes its one-shot, noncooperative solution. Section 3 constructs a re-
3peated interactions model of partial tax coordination in which some regions cooperate with
regard to their tax policies, while the other regions do not. Section 4 investigates the like-
lihood of partial tax coordination in a repeated interactions setting. Section 5 conducts the
same analysis in a model with linear utility. Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion
on extending our model. Some mathematical derivations are relegated to appendices.
2 The Model of Tax Competition
Consider an economy composed of N identical regions. The regions are indexed by the sub-
script i ∈ N = {1,···,N}. In each region, there exist a regional government, households, and
ﬁrms; households are immobile across the regions, while capital is perfectly mobile. These
factors are used in the production of a single homogenous good. As in Bucovetsky (1991,
2008), Grazzini and Ypersele (2003), and Devereux et al. (2008), we assume the constant-
returns-to-scale production function: f(ki) ≡ (A − ki)ki, i ∈ N, where the parameter A>0
represents the level of productivity, and ki is the per capita amount of capital employed in
region i. We further assume that A>2ki in order to ensure a positive but diminishing mar-
ginal productivity of capital. This speciﬁcation is needed to derive closed-form solutions for
tax rates and critical (minimum) discount factors for the repeated game presented later.
Public expenditures are ﬁnanced by a source-based tax on capital. Firms behave compet-
itively, and thus, production factors are priced at their marginal productivity:
r = f
0 (ki) − τi = A − 2ki − τi, (1)




where τi is the capital tax rate imposed by the government in region i, r is the net return on
capital, and wi is the region-speciﬁc wage rate. The entire supply of capital in the economy
is K. Each household inelastically supplies one unit of labor to regional ﬁrms so that the
households in each region own k ≡ K/N units of capital. Capital is allocated across the
4regions until the net return on capital is equalized. As a result, the arbitrage condition,
f0 (ki) − τi = r = f0 (kj) − τj for all i, j but i 6= j,m u s th o l di ne q u i l i b r i u m . B yi n v e r t i n g
(1), the demand for capital in each region can be expressed by ki(r +τi)=( 1 /2)(A−r −τi).
After substituting all of the demand functions for capital, ki(r + τi), ∀i ∈ N,i n t oki in the
capital market clearing condition,
PN
h=1 kh = Nk, we can derive the equilibrium interest rate
r∗:
r
∗ = A − 2k − τ,( 3 )
where τ ≡ (
PN
h=1 τh)/N is the average capital tax rate over all regions. By substituting (3)




i = k +
1
2
(τ − τi), ∀i ∈ N.( 4 )




















> 0, ∀i, j ∈ N but i 6= j.( 5 )
The objective of region i’s government is to maximize its tax revenue, denoted by Ri.I n
the fully noncooperative symmetric Nash equilibrium, taking all of the other regional choices
as given, the government in region i independently chooses τi to maximize its tax revenue:
Ri = τik∗
i.1 Assuming an interior solution and solving the ﬁrst-order conditions, ∂Ri/∂τi =0 ,







Taking into account that τi = τNE
N = τ and using (3), the corresponding net return is given by
rNE = A−2k−τNE
N > 0. Moreover, it follows from (4) that k∗
i ends up being equal to k;t h a t
is, there is no capital trade in equilibrium. Combining this nontrade equilibrium condition
1This simplest objective function enables us to explicitly obtain the minimum discount factor for the
repeated game setting deﬁned later and to carry out a comparative statics analysis with respect to some
principle parameters. We will later conduct the same analysis under linear utility.
2We always focus on an interior solution when solving an optimization problem, and so we omit this
qualiﬁcation in what follows.
5and (6), the tax revenue, RNE
N = τNE
N k∗








3 Partial Tax Coordination in a One-period Game
Let us suppose now that some regions coordinate their tax policies. More precisely, the subset
of regions, denoted by S = {1,···,S} ⊂ N, forms a coalition to coordinate their capital tax
rates at some prescribed level, while the rest of the regions belonging to the complementary
set N − S = {S +1,···,N} act fully noncooperatively. A coalition is deﬁned as any (proper)
subset of regions that contains at least two regions, and thus, the size of the coalition, S,i sa
positive integer between 2 and N −1. In this game, all the participating regions cooperatively
choose a capital tax rate in order to maximize the sum of the members’ regional tax revenues,
R(S) ≡
PS
h=1 Rh, while each of the nonparticipating regions, which belongs to the set N − S,
unilaterally maximizes its own regional tax revenue. By symmetry, every participating region
willingly agrees to choose a common (or harmonized) capital tax rate. Taking as given the
choices of tax rates by the participating, except for i, and the nonparticipating regions, the












=0 , i ∈ S. (8)
Since all the regions simultaneously choose their capital tax rates, taking as given the choices of
the tax rates by the coalition group and other nonparticipating regions, each nonparticipating
region, say j, unilaterally chooses a capital tax rate so as to maximize its own tax revenue Rj.









=0 , j ∈ N − S. (9)
6Substituting (4) and (5) into (8) and (9) and utilizing symmetry, we ﬁrst obtain the best-















where τS and τN−S represent the capital tax rates for regions within and outside the coalition
group, respectively. Note that the chosen regional tax rates given by (10) and (11) display
strategic complements, thus making these reaction functions upward sloping. Hence, this
property, together with the observation that ∂τS/∂τN−S < 1 and ∂τN−S/∂τS < 1, ensures the
uniqueness of the resulting Nash equilibrium, which we call “a Nash subgroup equilibrium” in
order to distinguish it from the fully noncooperative Nash equilibrium analyzed in the previous
section (see Konrad and Schjelderup, 1999).
By solving the simultaneous system of equations (10) and (11) for τS and τN−S, respec-
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. (13)









We now explore whether the subgroup of the cooperating regions can improve their tax
revenues by implementing partial tax coordination. For this, we ﬁrst substitute (12) and




























By multiplying (12) and (13) by (15) and (16), respectively, we ﬁnally obtain the tax revenues
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2 (2N + S − 2)
2 .( 1 8 )







N−S.( 1 9 )
It should be emphasized that both the regions within and outside the coalition clearly beneﬁt
from the creation of a subgroup coalition of cooperating regions. In other words, the creation
of a subgroup coalition generates higher tax revenues accrued to all regions as compared to
those in the fully noncooperative symmetric Nash equilibrium. The intuition behind this re-
sult is as follows. A coordinated increase in the capital tax rate chosen by the coalition group
tends to relax the intensity of tax competition between the coalition group and nonpartici-
pating regions, thereby inducing the latter to raise their tax rates as well (called the tax-rate
eﬀect), as indicated in (14). Moreover, since the tax rate set by the nonparticipating regions,
τC
N−S, is less than that set by the coalition group, τC
S, according to (14), the participating
and nonparticipating regions, respectively, become capital exporters and importers, which is
implied by (15) and (16) (called the tax-base eﬀect).
It is important to note that there is an incentive for regions to form a coalition in order to
coordinate their capital tax rates, since the tax revenues of the cooperating regions are larger
than those in the fully noncooperative symmetric Nash equilibrium. However, this gain does
8not necessarily deter the deviation of a member region from the coalition on the grounds that
the regions can potentially beneﬁt more from being noncoalition members.
4A R e p e a t e d G a m e
In this section, we construct a simple repeated partial tax coordination game with a common
discount factor denoted by δ ∈ [0,1). Let us assume that in every period, each participating
region agrees to coordinate its capital tax rate at the common tax rate τC
S provided that all
of the other member regions had followed the common tax rate in the previous period. If a
participating region deviates from it, then their coalition collapses, triggering the punishment
phase that results in a fully noncooperative Nash equilibrium, which persists forever. The












N , i ∈ S, (20)
where RD
i represents the tax revenue for the deviating region i. The left-hand side of (20) is
the discounted total tax revenue of region i when all coalition members belonging to the set
S continue to maintain τC
S inﬁnitely. The right-hand side represents the sum of the current
period’s tax revenue associated with the best-deviation tax rate τD
i and the discounted total
tax revenues associated with the fully noncooperative Nash equilibrium in all subsequent
p e r i o d s .B e c a u s eo fs y m m e t r y ,t h ec o n d i t i o n si n( 2 0 )r e d u c et oas i n g l ec o n d i t i o n .
The best-deviation tax rate τD
i is chosen so as to maximize the tax revenue of region i,
given that the other S −1 participating regions and all N −S nonparticipating regions follow
τC
S and τC















.( 2 1 )
By substituting (12) and (13) into τC
S and τC





N (2N − 1)(2N − S − 1)k
(N − 1)(N − S)(2N + S − 2)
.( 2 2 )









S.( 2 3 )
That is, the best-deviation tax rate is the second lowest tax rate; in other words, it is still
larger than the fully noncooperative Nash equilibrium tax rate.
By substituting (12), (13), and (22) into (4) and rearranging, we can compute the amounts
of the capital demanded in the deviating region i, participating regions in the set S−{i},a n d






























.( 2 6 )




i , which implies that deviator i not only changes its net capital position from an exporter
to an importer but also becomes the largest capital importer by levying the lowest capital
tax rate τD
i in the deviation phase. Moreover, although the unilateral deviation of region i
from the coordinated tax rate ends up with the smaller capital demands of all regions except
i, the capital demand of nonparticipating regions, kD
N−S, is still larger than that at the fully
noncooperative symmetric Nash equilibrium k.
By utilizing (12), (13), (22), (24), (25), and (26), we obtain the tax revenues of the deviating
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2




N(2N − 1)2 [2N(N − S − 1) + S +1 ]k
2




N(2N − S)[2N2(2N − S − 4) + (2N − 1)S +6 N − 1]k
2
(N − 1)(N − S)2(2N + S − 2)2 .
10By straightforward comparison, we ﬁnd that RD
S−i <R D
N−S <R D
i . As expected, deviator i
captures the largest one-period tax revenue by setting the least capital tax rate.
Substituting (7), (17), and (27) into the equality in (20) and rearranging yields the mini-










2 (S − 1)
(2S − 1)[2(2N + S)(N − S)+2 N(2N − S − 4) + 5S +1 ]
< 1.
(28)
Only when the actual discount factors for all the coalition members, δ, which are common for
all regions, are greater than or equal to δ(S, N), then the coordinated tax rate τC
S can be
sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game.
Diﬀerentiating the minimum regional discount factor δ(S, N) with respect to the group




4(2N − 1)2 [N(2N − 1) + 2S(S − 2)(N + S − 1) + 2S − 1]
(2S − 1)2 [2(2N + S)(N − S)+2 N(2N − S − 4) + 5S +1 ]




4(2N − 1)(S − 1)[2S(N + S − 2) + 1]
(2S − 1)[2(2N + S)(N − S)+2 N(2N − S − 4) + 5S +1 ]
2 < 0.( 3 0 )
Moreover, since lim
S, N→∞
(S/N) ≤ 1 and lim
S, N→∞











which, together with (29) and (30), implies that partial tax coordination can be sustained
irrespective of the group size, provided the actual discount factors of the coalition members δ
are suﬃciently close to 1.
These observations lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (i) If all the participating regions are suﬃciently patient, partial tax coordina-
tion can be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game irrespective
of the size of the coalition;
(ii) the larger (smaller) the number of participating regions, the more diﬃcult (easier) it is for
partial tax coordination to prevail; and
11(iii) the larger (smaller) the total number of regions in the economy, the easier (more diﬃcult)
it is for partial tax coordination to prevail.
To gain the insight underlying Proposition 1, we need to know how an increase in the
coalition size S (or the total number of regions, N)a ﬀects the tax revenues of the respective
regions at all phases of the present repeated game. To this end, we ﬁrst diﬀerentiate RC
S with
















∂S | {z }
tax-base eﬀect (−)
=
2N(2N − 1)2(3S − 2)k
2
(N − S)2(2N + S − 2)3 > 0,( 3 1 )
which reveals that increasing the group size S has two opposite eﬀects on the tax revenues of the
participating regions; that is, the ﬁrst and second terms in the middle expression of (31) stand
for the positive tax-rate and negative tax-base (i.e., ﬁscal externality) eﬀects, respectively.
Since an increase in S mitigates the intensity of tax competition, the tax rates imposed by
the participating and nonparticipating regions both rise (recall that the choice variables are
strategic complements). Moreover, since it is conﬁrmed by straightforward computation that
the tax rate set by the coalition subgroup rises more than that set by the noncoalition regions,
i.e., ∂τC
S/∂S>∂τC
N−S/∂S>0, it further widens the tax diﬀerential, τC
S − τC
N−S > 0.T h i s
i m p a c tg i v e sr i s et oam o r ec a p i t a lﬂight from the coalition group to the noncoalition regions,
thereby further shrinking the tax bases of the coalition members, as indicated in (15). As shown
in the last expression in (31), however, the positive tax-rate eﬀect dominates the negative tax-
base eﬀect in absolute value, thus resulting in larger tax revenues accrued to the coalition
members.
Similarly, the eﬀect of an increase in S on the tax revenue of the deviating region i can be
















∂S | {z }
(+)
> 0.( 3 2 )
Although an increase in S unambiguously raises τD
i as a result of the mitigated pressure of
12tax competition as before (i.e., the positive tax-rate eﬀect), in order to identify the eﬀect on
kD
i (i.e., the tax-base eﬀect), we need to know the eﬀect of increasing S on the tax rates set




i /∂S>0. Hence, an increase in S enlarges the gap between
the taxes set by the deviating region i and the coalition group, as well as that set by the
deviating region i and the nonparticipating regions. As a result, since the deviating region
can attract more capital from both of the participating and nonparticipating regions, the tax
revenue accrued to the deviating region unambiguously increases due to the resulting larger
t a xb a s em u l t i p l i e db yt h eh i g h e rt a xr a t e .
With these results, we can shed some light on how changes in the group size aﬀect the
likelihood of cooperation. Each participating region has to compare the immediate gain from
its unilateral deviation with the opportunity cost when reverting to the fully noncooperative
Nash equilibrium in all the subsequent periods in order to decide on whether or not to coop-
erate. To this end, suppose that the actual discount factor of the coalition member is equal
to the minimum discount factor δ(S, N) deﬁned by the equality in (20). Then subtracting
RC
S from the resulting equality yields the following expression:
δ(S, N)












S.( 3 3 )
The left-hand side of (33) represents the discounted future (opportunity) costs from unilateral
deviation, while its right-hand side is the immediate gain from deviating. For ease of expo-
sition, we further decompose the discounted future costs into two components: the discount
factor component δ(S, N)/(1 − δ(S, N)) and the opportunity cost incurred by the deviator,
RC
S −RNE
N . It follows from (7) (RNE
N is independent of S), (31), and (32) that the future loss,
RC
S − RNE
N , and the immediate gain, RD
i − RC
S, are both increasing in S. Nevertheless, (29)
indicates that the gain is larger than the loss, so that the coalition member has a stronger
incentive to deviate. This stems from the fact that the positive eﬀect of increasing S on RD
i
should be much larger than that on RC
S, because the tax-rate and tax-base eﬀects in ∂RC
S/∂S
operate in opposite directions, whereas these two eﬀects in ∂RD
i /∂S do in the same direction.
13Hence, the minimum discount factor δ(S, N) should be higher so as to satisfy the equality in
(33).
Next, we can investigate how increasing the total number of regions, N,a ﬀects the incentive
of the participating regions to maintain partial tax coordination in an analogous manner.
Diﬀerentiating RC
















∂N | {z }
(+)
< 0.
Although we can identify the tax-rate and tax-base eﬀects of the increase in N on the tax
revenues accrued to the participating regions as before, the signs of these two eﬀects are
reversed to those resulting from increasing S.A n i n c r e a s e i n N intensiﬁes tax competition,
which in turn depresses the tax rates set by the participating and nonparticipating regions.
Since it can be further veriﬁed that ∂τC
S/∂N<∂τC
N−S/∂N<0 — that is, the tax rate
set by the participating regions falls more than that set by the nonparticipating regions —
their tax diﬀerential will shrink, thus reducing the amount of capital ﬂight from the coalition
to the nonparticipating regions and increasing the tax bases of the participating regions.
Nevertheless, since the negative tax-rate eﬀect dominates this positive tax-base eﬀect, the
increase in N reduces the tax revenues accrued to the participating regions RC
S.
In the deviation phase, by diﬀerentiating (22) and (24) with respect to N,w ec a nc o n ﬁrm
that the tax-rate and tax-base eﬀects are both negative; consequently, the eﬀect on the tax
















∂N | {z }
(−)
< 0.
Since it is straightforward to check that ∂τC
S/∂N<∂τC
N−S/∂N<∂τD
i /∂N<0,t h ei n c r e a s e
in N reduces all taxes as a result of the intensiﬁed tax competition. Since the tax rates
chosen by the participating and nonparticipating regions both fall more than that chosen by
the deviating region, the decreased tax diﬀerential between the deviating and other regions
reduces the tax base of deviator i, kD
i .T h i si m p a c t ,c o u p l e dw i t ht h en e g a t i v et a x - r a t ee ﬀect,
14reduces its tax revenue rDkD
i , which clearly discourages an incentive to deviate.
Finally, in the symmetric Nash equilibrium phase, an increase in N creates the only neg-










To sum up, although an increase in the total number of regions, N, reduces both the
immediate gain from deviating, RD
i − RC
S, and the future opportunity cost incurred by the
deviator, RC
S − RNE
N , in every period, (30) indicates that the reduction in RD
i should be in
absolute value much larger than that in RC
S. As a consequence, the only lower minimum
discount factor δ(S, N) can satisfy the equality of (33).
Although the general message of the literature on tax competition is that there are various
potential ineﬃciencies associated with tax competition, our analysis based on the repeated
interactions model reveals that the intensiﬁed tax competition (associated with the larger
N) makes the coalition members more cooperative to sustain partial tax coordination, while
increasing the tax revenues of all the regions. In other words, tax competition is beneﬁcial
in the sense that it serves in enhancing the sustainability of welfare-improving partial tax
coordination.3 Since it is well documented that tax competition may have eﬃciency- or welfare-
enhancing eﬀects, such as the beneﬁts of restraining Leviathan tendencies for overexpansion of
the public sector (Edwards and Keen, 1996), or of limiting the incentive for time-inconsistent
governments to increase capital income taxes once an investment location decision has been
made (Conconi et al. 2008), our ﬁnding, which has not been addressed in the literature
that focuses on full-tax coordination, would also provide another justiﬁcation to defend tax
competition.
3Note that although a coordinated tax increase yields a higher level of tax revenue accrued to the revenue-
maximizing Leviathan governments in our model, it does not imply an increase in the “waste” of resources
unlike the Leviathan government deﬁned by Edwards and Keen (1996) which diverts tax revenue for its own
uses. This diﬀerence arises because the primary function of the Leviathan government we have assumed in
this paper is to either transfers entirely tax revenue to residents or spends it to provide public goods.
155 The Model under Linear Preferences
In this section, we assume that the objective of regional governments is to maximize the
representative resident’s utility rather than the tax revenues. Each household residing in
region i derives utility from the consumption of a single homogenous good xi and a local
public good (or redistributed income to households) Gi. By making use of (2), (3), and (4),
the budget constraint of a representative inhabitant in the region i, xi = wi + r∗k,c a nb e






i. Given the budget constraints for households and
the region i’s government, Gi = τik∗
i, the government selects τi so as to maximize its resident’s
utility Ui deﬁned below. To obtain explicit analytical solutions to our repeated interactions
model, as in Cardarelli et al. (2002), Bucovetsky (2008), and Itaya et al. (2008), Devereus et
al. (2008), we assume a linear utility function such as
Ui ≡ U(xi,G i) ≡ xi + γGi,










+( γ − 1)τik
∗
i,( 3 4 )
where γ > 1 denotes a preference parameter toward the local public good Gi.4 Solving
the ﬁrst-order conditions, ∂Ui/∂τi =0 , ∀i ∈ N, together with (5), we can obtain the fully






.( 3 5 )
As in the previous model, taking as given the choices of tax rates by all the other regions,
all coalition members cooperatively choose a common capital tax rate so as to maximize the
welfare function: W(S) ≡
PS
h=1 Uh. The resulting ﬁrst-order condition is
∂W(S)
∂τi














(k − kh)=0 , i ∈ S,( 3 6 )
which, by symmetry, is reduced to a single equation. As before, each nonparticipating region
4Since the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption xi and a local public good Gi is equal
to 1, the condition γ > 1 is necessary to ensure an interior solution for Gi.
16simultaneously and independently chooses its capital tax rate in order to maximize its own
utility Uj.T h eﬁrst-order condition leads to
∂Uj
∂τj











j)=0 , j ∈ N − S,( 3 7 )
which also is reduced to a single equation. Solving (36) and (37) simultaneously for τi and
τj, together with (4) and (5), yields the Nash subgroup equilibrium tax rates (see Appendix




2(γ − 1)[N(N(γ − 1) + γ(N − 1) + S) − S(S − 1)]k
γ (N − S)[(2γ − 1)(N − 1) + γS]




2(γ − 1)[N(N(2γ − 1) − S(γ − 1)) − S(S − 1)]k
γ (N − S)[(2γ − 1)(N − 1) + γS]
.( 3 9 )
The ﬁrst-order condition, after substituting (38) and (39), yields the best-deviation tax





γ(N − 1)(N − S)[N(2γ − 1) + 1][(2γ − 1)(N − 1) + γS]
,( 4 0 )
where Λ ≡ N(N−1)[(2γ−1)N+S][γ(N−S)+N(γ−1)+1]−(S−1)[N(γ−1)+1][S(N−1)+
γN] > 0. Comparing the taxes given by (35), (38), (39), and (40), we obtain precisely the same
ranking regarding the tax rates as (23) (see Appendix B), so does the net capital-exporting
position of regions associated with the respective phases.
With these results, the condition to sustain partial tax coordination for each coalition












N , i ∈ S,( 4 1 )
where UC
S , UD
i ,a n dUNE
N represent the utility levels associated with the cooperative (i.e.,
partial coordination), deviation, and punishment (i.e., the fully noncooperative symmetric
Nash equilibrium) phases, respectively. Utilizing (3), (4), (34), (35), (38), (39), and (40) and
17rearranging, we can compute the minimum discount factor (see Appendix C for derivations):








γN2(S − 1)[N(2γ − 1) − (γ − 1)]2
[NS(2γ − 1) + S − γN]Ω
< 1, (42)
where Ω ≡ [(N − 1)(γ − 1) + γN][2(N − S)[N(2γ − 1) + 1] + γN(S − 1)] + γ(N − S)(S −
1)[N(2γ − 1) + 1] > 0.D i ﬀerentiating the minimum discount factor in (42) with respect to
the group size S, the total number of regions N, and the preference parameter γ, respectively,
yields the following results (see Appendix D):
∂δ(S, N, γ)
∂S
> 0,( 4 3 )
∂δ(S, N, γ)
∂N







 R 0 and
∂δ(S, N, γ)
∂N







 < 0,( 4 4 )
∂δ(S, N, γ)
∂γ
< 0.( 4 5 )
Note, however, that when the number of regions, N,g o e st oi n ﬁnity (S m a ya l s og ot oi n ﬁnity),






















These observations lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For the linear utility function given by (34), we have the following:
(i) If all the cooperating regions are suﬃciently patient, partial tax coordination can be sus-
tained as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game provided the coalition size of tax
coordination is ﬁnite;
(ii) partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the coalition size of tax coordination is
smaller and/or the preference toward a local public good is stronger; and
18(iii) partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the total number of regions in the
economy is larger, provided the preference toward a local public good is suﬃciently strong.
In order to understand how the parameters S, N,a n dγ aﬀect the behavior of the respective
regions, we ﬁrst diﬀerentiate the welfare levels of the regions at the respective phases of the




























∂S | {z }
terms-of-trade eﬀect (−)
























∂S | {z }
(+)
> 0,( 4 8 )
where rC ≡ A−2k−[SτC
S+(N−S)τC




represent the corresponding net returns in the cooperation and deviation phases, respectively.
Since the tax rates chosen by the participating and nonparticipating regions both rise in
response to the mitigated intensity of tax competition, so does the average tax rate τ.T h e
increase in S, therefore, reduces the equilibrium net return: ∂rC/∂S<0 and ∂rD/∂S<0.
Moreover, (47) and (48), together with (4), (38), (39), and (40), reveal not only that the signs of
the tax-rate and tax-base eﬀects are the same as those in the previous model, but also that the
terms-of-trade eﬀect emerges as an additional term. The terms-of-trade eﬀect tends to reduce
the welfare of the coalition members (i.e., capital exporters), whereas it tends to enhance that
of the deviating region (i.e., capital importers), thereby unambiguously strengthening the
incentive of deviation. Since the capital importers (i.e., the nonparticipating regions) beneﬁt
from the higher tax rate due to lower capital payments resulting from a lower interest rate
(i.e., the terms-of-trade eﬀect), they enjoy more tax revenues than the capital exporters (i.e.,
the participating regions) do. This result is essentially the same as that in an asymmetric two-
country model of Wilson (1991), which demonstrates that a small country is always better oﬀ
than a large country as a result of tax competition. Since we can view the coalition subgroup of
cooperating regions and each noncooperating region outside the coalition as “a large country”
19and “a small country”, respectively, each noncooperating region will be more better oﬀ than
any of the coalition members.5
As before, consider the case where the actual discount factor of the coalition member, δ,
is equal to the minimum discount factor δ(S, N, γ). Subtracting UC
S from both sides of the
resulting equality in (41), we can obtain the following expression:
δ(S, N, γ)












S .( 4 9 )
A straightforward calculation shows that the one-period loss, UC
S − UNE
N ,a n dt h ei m m e d i a t e
gain, UD
i − UC
S , are both increasing in the group size S. Nevertheless, (43) indicates that the
rise in UD
i should be in absolute value much larger than that in UC
S , and thus the minimum
discount factor δ(S, N, γ) should be higher.
Similarly, we can compute the eﬀect of the larger N on the utility levels of the respective
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(−)
< 0.( 5 2 )
The intuition is as follows. An increase in N strengthens the intensity of tax competition,
which in turn decreases the average tax rate. It follows that ∂rC/∂N>0 and ∂rD/∂N>0.
On the other hand, it is seen from (50), (51), and (52) that at the cooperative and deviation
phases, the signs of the tax-rate, tax-base and terms-trade eﬀects are all reversed to those of
changes in S, because of the opposite eﬀects on the intensity of tax competition to those of
changes in S. The terms-of-trade eﬀect tends to augment the welfare of the coalition members
(i.e., capital exporters), while it tends to reduce the welfare of the nonparticipating regions
5Also note that this result is consistent with Proposition 1 in Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) since tax
rates are strategic complements.
20Figure 1: The minimum discount factor δ(S, N, γ) for S =3 .
(i.e., capital importers), both of which together strengthen the incentive of cooperation. In
contrast, the level of welfare at the fully noncooperative Nash equilibrium falls in N due to
the negative tax-rate eﬀect (recall that there are no tax-base and no terms-trade eﬀects),
which discourages the incentive of cooperation. Although the ﬁrst two eﬀects and the last
eﬀect operate in opposite directions, (44) reveals that the precise eﬀect on the minimum
discount factor depends on the size of the preference parameter γ. As shown in Appendix
D, if γ ≥ (7 +
√
13)/6 ' 1.767, the minimum discount factor δ(S, N, γ) unambiguously
falls in N, while it may or may not fall in N if 1 < γ < (7 +
√
13)/6. To further identify
the latter case, we employ a numerical analysis, which shows that when γ and S are both
small, the minimum discount factor rises in N. Figure 1 illustrates that both δ (3,N ,1.1)
and δ(3,N ,1.3) decline in N for lower values of N and then rise slightly in N.W h e nS is
relatively large (i.e., S =1 0and S =2 5 ), δ(S, N, γ) monotonically falls in N irrespective of
the size of γ, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. In sum, it may be concluded that even in the model
with linear utility, increasing N in general strengthens the incentive of cooperation, except
when the group size S relative to N is extremely small.
Finally, diﬀerentiating the welfare levels of the respective regions at all phases with respect
21Figure 2: The minimum discount factor δ(S, N, γ) for S =1 0 .
Figure 3: The minimum discount factor δ(S, N, γ) for S =2 5 .
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Ah i g h e rγ stimulates the demand for a local public good in all phases, so that the inhabitants
in the regions prefer higher capital tax rates. This in turn weakens the intensity of tax
competition and thus raises the average tax rate, leading to a fall in the net return, i.e.,
∂rC/∂γ < 0 and ∂rD/∂γ < 0. Hence, the resulting signs of the tax-rate, tax-base, and
terms-of-trade eﬀe c t sa r et h es a m ea st h o s eo fc h a n g e si nS. In addition, the increase in γ
also enhances directly the marginal utility of a local public good (which we call the ‘direct
preference eﬀect’) in all phases. Most notably, (45) implies that the increase in γ discourages
the incentive of deviation, thereby lowering the minimum discount factor, which is opposed to
the eﬀect of increasing S. This result is mainly caused by the presence of the direct preference
eﬀect which makes an increase in UC
S larger compared to an increase in UNE
S associated with
higher γ.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, we constructed a repeated interactions model where some regions collude to
coordinate their capital tax rates and the other regions do not, and found that partial tax
coordination can sustain as an equilibrium outcome if the regions are suﬃciently patient.
We have also shown that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the number of
cooperating regions is smaller and the total number of regions in the whole economy is larger.
In light of our results, global tax coordination is the most vulnerable outcome in the sense
that the incentive to deviate becomes the strongest. Hence, our repeated interactions model
23further suggests that the size of a coalition, which implements tax coordination, should be
set equal to the maximum sustainable number of members in a coalition, since the welfare
of cooperating and noncooperating regions bothi n c r e a s ei nac o a l i t i o ns i z e .I no t h e rw o r d s ,
there is a desirable intermediate coalition size in order to implement tax coordination because
there is a trade-oﬀ between the sustainability of a coalition and the welfare level of cooperating
regions; that is, although a much more encompassing tax coordination leads to a ﬁrst-best
solution, sustainability becomes more diﬃcult.
These results would also provide a useful lesson for the intense discussion on corporate tax
coordination, including tax-rate harmonization, in the EU for many years. Partial tax coor-
dination within EU member nations would be desirable rather than world-wide organizations
such as a “World Tax Organization” suggested by Tanzi (1998) or multilateral agreements
such as a “GATT for Taxes” to achieve global tax coordination for the following reasons:
ﬁrst, partial tax coordination would be more sustainable compared to global tax coordination
because of the existence of the signiﬁcant fringe of competing countries in the tax competition;
second, it is beneﬁcial not only for EU member nations, which maintain partial tax coopera-
tion, but also for the other nations outside the EU, since a collapse of the coalition would lead
to a harmful “race to the bottom” with all the nations in the world.
The results obtained in this analysis critically rely on the restrictive structure of the present
model, such as linear utility and a quadratic production function. To make the model more
realistic and the results more robust, it is certainly desirable that the analysis should be
conducted under more general forms of those functions. For this purpose, we need to resort
to a numerical analysis. The more important extension is to include the introduction of
regional asymmetries in terms of capital endowments and/or production technologies and
explore how the likelihood of partial tax coordination is aﬀected by changes in the degree of
the asymmetries.
24Appendix A
Making use of (4), (5), and (36) for all i ∈ S yields the reaction function as follows:
τS =
(N − S)[N(γ − 1) + S]τN−S +2 N2(γ − 1)k
(N − S)[N(2γ − 1) + S]
,( A . 1 )
where τS and τN−S denote the capital tax rates for cooperators and noncooperators, respec-
tively. Similarly, from (4), (5), and (37) for all j ∈ N − S, we have the following best-response
function:
τN−S =
S [N(γ − 1) + 1]τS +2 N2(γ − 1)k
N [γ(N − 1) + S(γ − 1)] + S
.( A . 2 )
Solving (A.1) and (A.2) for τS and τN−S, respectively, gives the tax rates (38) and (39) in
the Nash equilibrium with a coalition subgroup. Further, using (4) and (5), the ﬁrst-order




[N(γ − 1) + 1][(S − 1)τS +( N − S)τN−S]+2 N2(γ − 1)k
(N − 1)[N(2γ − 1) + 1]
.( A . 3 )
Substituting (38) and (39) into (A.3) and manipulating yields the best-deviation tax rate (40).
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> 0, (B.5)









































where ∆1 ≡ 2(N − S)[N(γ − 1) + 1](τC
S − τC
N−S)+( N − 1)2(τC
S − τD
i ) − 2N[2N(γ − 1)k −
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where ∆2 ≡ [(N − S)(τC
S − τC
N−S) − (N − 1)(τC
S − τD
i )][(N − S)(τC
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i ],a n drNE = A−2k−τNE
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2
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2. (C.4)





the minimum discount factor (42).
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γN2[N(2γ − 1) − (γ − 1)]2
[NS(2γ − 1) + S − γN]2Ω2 ×
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−2γN (S − 1)[N(2γ − 1) − (γ − 1)]Φ




−2N2 (N − 1)(N − S)(S − 1)[N(2γ − 1) − (γ − 1)]Ψ
[NS(2γ − 1) + S − γN]2Ω2 < 0,
where ∂Ω/∂S ≡− [N(γ − 1) + 1][N(2γ − 1) + γ(2S − 3) + 2] − 2γ2N(S − 1) < 0, Φ ≡
S(N −1)3[N +S (N − 2)]+2γ4N3(2S −1)[2S(N +S −2)+1]−Nγ3[2S3[6N (N − 1)+1]+
2S2[2N(N −1)(5N −9)−3]+2NS(5N −3)+S−N2]+Sγ2(N −1)[N3(18S+7)+N2[S(6S−
43)−3]+NS(23−6S)+S(S −3)]−Sγ(N −1)2[N2(7S +5)+N[S(S −15)−2]−S(S −5)],
and Ψ ≡ S[N(2γ − 1) + 1][N2(2γ − 1)2 − γ[γ(S − 3) + 3] + N[γ(7 − 5γ) − 2] + 1] − Nγ3 > 0.
Further computation reveals that Φ > 0 if γ ≥ (7+
√
13)/6, while the sign of Φ is ambiguous
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